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Preface 
This report presents the results of work done as “Task 1” of the Work Package 1 (WP1) on 
“Innovation Processes”. WP 1 is one of four sub-projects in the project “Understanding 
innovation in a globalizing economy:  The Norwegian case” funded by the Research 
Council of Norway, in their research program “Vekstforsk”.  
 
The rationale for the project “Understanding innovation in a globalizing economy:  The 
Norwegian case” is based on the recognition that as a result of globalization, new ways of 
organizing production and new modes of innovation have emerged. The traditional ways of 
closed modes of innovation and intra-mural knowledge bases have increasingly been 
substituted by more open modes of innovation and distributed knowledge networks. The 
goal of the project is to analyze this and develop a new conceptual framework relevant for 
innovation policy in Norway.  
 
Within this framework, the aim of WP1 on “Innovation Processes” is to study knowledge 
generation and innovation processes in different types of Norwegian firms and industries 
(dominated among other things by specific knowledge bases), and in different regional 
settings. In “Task 1” of this, the aim is to describe, analyze and discuss the existing, 
contemporary research and knowledge base that are relevant for approaching the topic of 
WP1. The results of this work are presented in this report. 
 
The report has been written by Helge Godø of NIFU STEP, in collaboration with Sverre 
Herstad and Trude Røsdal, who have also contributed with comments of drafts. 
 
 
Oslo, March 2009 
 
 
Per Hetland 
Director 
Olav R. Spilling 
Research director and project leader 
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1 Introduction – How firms innovate 
During the past decades, companies have gradually changed how they organize and 
implement innovation activities and, more significant, decision making and strategies 
related to product and process development, R&D. Essentially; this is all about how firms 
attempt to develop competitive advantages by means of innovation.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview over existing, contemporary research 
literature, in order to evaluate and discuss issues and questions that are relevant for the 
research agenda on how firms organize their innovation activities – and why. More 
specifically, this topic will be approached by posing the questions initially asked in the 
proposal for this project. The main questions posed were: 
 
• How do firms make decisions on innovation activities?  
• Who decides, and what are the factors that guide strategies and tactics of innovation 
activities?  
• More specifically, when and why do firms decentralize or centralize R&D and 
innovation activities?  
• What internal resources beyond R&D staff enter as key contributors to these activities? 
• What determines their mix and build-up of an innovation portfolio?  
• When and why do firms make or break alliances with their competitors in innovation 
activities?  
• What kind of role does private equity and venture capitalists play in firms’ innovation 
strategy and performance? 
 
Needless to say, these questions are broad, so broad that attempting to answer these in a 
satisfactory or comprehensive way is almost impossible, at least within the framework of 
this project.  Still, the paper will attempt to present the research according to general 
characteristics of the approaches, such as focus, analytical levels and units, theoretical 
positions and disciplinary affiliation, types of explanations offered, etc. At the end of this 
paper, the material presented will be discussed and evaluated in terms of its implications 
for the current research and analyses. This is particularly relevant now because we are in 
the process of analyzing the results from the MINE-survey in Norway. In this, response 
was obtained from 56 industrial firms that are characterized as being innovative. This 
material, together with analyses of the material from the international MINE survey 
(almost 1,000 responding firms) will become the main task in the next phase of the project. 
 
The main challenge in doing a review on the topics of this paper is an abundance of 
research literature. This abundance reflects an increasing interest for innovation in general 
because innovation has now become widely acknowledged as essential and strategic in a 
number of areas that are important in society, such as profitability and long-term viability 
of industry, industrial and regional development, various areas of policy making, level of 
  8 
welfare of society, international competitiveness, etc. In spite of this abundance, the 
questions asked above do not have clear answers, which may explain why some innovation 
research scientists characterize innovation processes within firms as a “black box”, 
suggesting that knowledge and explanations in this area do not provide satisfactory 
insights. In addition to being abundant, the research literature may be characterized as 
highly heterogeneous, so much that one may wonder if researchers are focusing on the 
same phenomenon, i.e. on how firms innovate. In the rest of this introduction, this will be 
briefly commented because this aspect is relevant for understanding the delineation and 
focus of this paper. 
 
One large bulk of literature in innovation studies is what may be termed “practical 
handbooks” in the sense that these have a prescriptive intent, i.e. they provide tangible 
advice on how managers (mostly) and people involved in innovation processes should do 
their work, e.g. product developers. Although some of these appear to be based on research 
(or claim that their advice is built on “solid” research, cf. works of the product 
development guru Robert G. Cooper  (1996; 2000)) or insights of people who have 
profound understanding and experience in work with innovation processes,  the main 
purpose of this literature is give advice, often termed as “best practice”. The journal IEEE 
Engineering Management fits into this category because many of the articles are on 
technical topics related product and process development performance and quality.  
 
A similar, but more interesting type literature in terms of research belongs to a category 
which may be labelled as having a normative intent. This literature is also highly 
heterogeneous, reflecting that there are many normative positions in this type of research, 
implying that innovation researchers doing this type of research have political sympathies 
that at times are explicit in their policy or ideological agendas. One classic topic is related 
to the role of market dynamics in innovation, i.e. belief in the powers and virtues of market 
mechanism for society, hence advocacy of policies that promote market mechanisms in 
innovation (Drucker, 1985; Hope, 2003; von Hippel, 1988; von Zedtwitz & Gassman, 
2002). In opposition to these, there are researchers (Dosi, 1988; Lundvall, 1988; 
Rosenberg, 1994) who suggest more complex and alternative explanations; by this they 
contest the supremacy of market mechanism in innovation. An earlier and authoritative 
review of this tension is provided in Mowery and Rosenberg (1982). A different type of 
innovation studies that have normative orientation put emphasis on promoting key 
conceptual frameworks from which normative prescriptions are derived. One of these 
which is currently enjoying some success is the idea of “Open Innovations” (H. 
Chesbrough, 2003; H. Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006). Earlier, the notion of 
“core” had a similar success, such in the concept of “core competency” (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1994) and “core business” (Porter, 1990), although in the latter the role of 
innovation processes is less pronounced.  
 
A third category of innovation research may be classified as having an ontological intent 
because its main purpose is to understand and explain innovation as a phenomenon, 
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without necessarily advocating any policy positions or giving advice on how things ought 
to be done. In fact, Bruno Latour, one of the researchers of this category, has explained that 
he is “agnostic” in terms of outcomes of innovation activities, i.e. that he does not want to 
make assessment as to the merits or criticize the outcomes of innovation activities – he just 
wants to explain what happens when something new is created. Within this group, there is 
also an abundance of research that is interesting because of the insights that they provide 
on innovation processes. Some of these will be elaborated in the following pages, such as 
the conceptual frameworks of:  
- technological regimes (Malerba, 2004; Rip & Kemp, 1998) 
- innovation journey (Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkararaman, 1999) 
- innovation game (Miller & Floricel, 2007; Tirpak, Miller, Schwartz, & Kashdan, 2006) 
 
Although using these three, broad categories of innovation models, i.e. prescriptive, 
normative and ontological, may be fertile for understanding different perceptions and 
interpretations of innovation, these categories will not structure the analyses in this paper. 
Instead, the focus will be set on how firms make decisions on innovations. This will cover 
a broad range of issues, starting with the question of why firms (mostly) do innovations as 
an in-house activity. After this, the focus will be set on decision-making related to 
innovation activities and various organizational aspects related to this. Then the paper will 
explore some structural perspectives that influence innovation strategies and decision-
making in firms, including what may be termed as “strategy cycles”, i.e. oscillation 
between various types of strategies that firms pursue.  
 
The last part of the paper will look more closely at the conceptual framework of 
“innovation games”, because this is important for understanding the MINE-survey. After 
this, the paper will conclude with a discussion and analyses of research items and topics 
that are relevant for elucidating the questions related to how and why firms make decisions 
on innovation activities. In this conclusion, the paper suggests that the early stages (initial 
period) of an innovation process seems to be very crucial, yet poorly understood because 
of its complexity and elusiveness. Although this is recognized by some research and by 
many practitioners, and reflected in concepts such as “gestation period” (i.e. pregnancy) 
and “Fuzzy Front-End” of innovation, there is little research that in this area. In this, 
research seems to ignore important factors such as the role of serendipity and aesthetics – 
and the notion of homo ludens which often appears to be important when innovation 
processes are initiated and for this reason sets the course and direction of the innovation 
process. This should be a topic for further research, however, before this may be done, we 
need to have a better understanding of more prosaic aspects and factors related to 
innovation processes. 
  10 
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2 What is the problem? 
In a seminal paper from 1988, David Teece (1988) asks why firms – in spite of what 
economists believe is rational – resist or are hesitant in terms of outsourcing technological 
development, i.e. why firms persist at keeping these types of activities and others related to 
innovation in-house. Furthermore, he asks why are “make or buy”-decisions related to 
technological development so difficult? And why are these issues considered as crucial to 
the firms’ strategies? Following this, why do firms tend to specialize and “stick to” certain 
fields and technologies? One reason he asks these questions is that “...standard 
microeconomic analysis would indicate that contracting for R&D-services from an 
established low-cost provider will be the superior alternative, just as it would be for any 
other service or component” (Teece, 1988, p. 259). In analyzing this, Teece argues that 
there are no type of contracts or contractual relationships that are able to govern innovation 
activities in a way that serves the requirements of these types of activities. He gives 
numerous examples from firms that have attempted and abandoned this because their 
experience with outsourcing technological development and innovation activities showed 
that this did not provide the cost reductions or quality improvements that they expected. 
Secondly, Teece suggests that “..profit-seeking firms have limited abilities to change 
products and technologies” (1988, p. 266), indicating that most firms are governed by a 
technological lock-in and associated path-dependencies. These considerations – that most 
firms seem to think that doing innovation activities in-house makes good sense and that 
they tend to specialize in certain technological areas – do not contradict that they 
simultaneously may enter into collaborative relationships with outsiders, even competitors, 
on various innovation projects. A common type of external collaboration is with public 
institutions such as universities and public research institutes in joint R&D projects. Still, 
innovation, or R&D as Teece calls this, has to be an activity dominated and controlled by 
the firm itself.  
 
The views that Teece expounded in this 1988 paper were significant because it was 
published in at period when the Zeitgeist advocated a radical downsizing of R&D in firms, 
as typical of what Roussel, Saad and Kash (1991) call the “2nd generation R&D”. To 
illustrate, in this period some top managers who advocated this type of policy, would state 
in interviews that if they should for some reason need R&D and product development work 
to be done, they would just pick up the phone and order this from an outside vendor, just 
like ordering a pizza: Why should they bother to keep and staff a pizza bakery in-house to 
serve this need? In spite of these sentiments, statistics indicate that the level of private 
sector R&D and other types of innovation activities has remained stable, some figures 
indicate a slow growth mode in a long term perspective (S. Herstad, 2008, pp. 38-39) over 
the past decades. Although some sectors have undergone restructuring in terms of the 
division of labour related to R&D and innovation, this is still predominantly done inside 
firms as an in-house activity. This is seen in traditionally R&D-intensive sectors such as 
telecommunications, electronics and computers where large telecommunications operating 
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companies such as AT&T and British Telecom has reduced its in-house R&D 
significantly, while equipment manufacturers have absorbed this reduction and the sector 
itself has increased its spending on R&D and innovation. Still, there are pundits, mainly 
economists, who have continued to argue for the type of R&D and innovation strategy 
advocated by this “2nd generation” strategy, however, now with new labels. One of these 
carries the label of “Open Innovations” (Chesbrough et al., 2007; 2006), and perhaps by 
this, attempt to make an association and resemblance to the successful “open source”-
movement of the computer science world, i.e. the type of working style and cooperation 
that has evolved from hackers (Godø, 2002). 
 
According to the tenets of “Open Innovation”, firms should enter into co-development 
partnerships, into what Chesbrough et al. term as “..mutual working relationship between 
two or more parties aimed at creating and delivering a new product, technology or service” 
(2007, p. 55). The basics in this prescription is sharing costs and risks with other firms in 
technology development and innovation activities, and the opportunities of leveraging 
complementarities in terms of unique expertise and competence from each firm 
participating in the collaboration. In addition, these types of collaboration will expand the 
size of a firm’s networks. Although one may be sceptical to some of the reasons advocated 
by the “Open Innovation” model because it violates or underestimates many of the 
problems that plague collaboration between firms (e.g. transaction costs and trust), there is 
a deeper, more fundamental reason for why this model has merits – and empirical evidence 
supports its viability: As technological development, in particular explorative, radical 
technology development is becoming more and more complex and specialized (and more 
costly), many development projects are beyond the capabilities of a single firm, even large 
firms or nations. The GSM development (Godoe, 2000, 2006) and Internet (Mowery & 
Simcoe, 2002) are examples of successful “open innovation” – maybe for different reasons 
than Chesbrough would want to point to. In a sense, “Open Innovation” is inevitable as a 
new type of division of labour in society for creating innovation, in particular radical 
innovation. For this reason, resent research (Herstad et al.,2008) has suggested that the 
concept of “Global Open Innovation” is more fertile and accurate.  This concept is 
supported by findings based on analyses of Community Innovation Survey data from four 
European countries. Accordingly, they suggest that “..it is primarily the overall openness of 
organisations which impact positively on innovation performance, in addition to intramural 
R&D and international collaboration within the value chain, i.e. with customers and 
suppliers” (2008, p. 61). But this is a social system perspective which does not accord with 
the capitalist assumptions that underlie Chesbrough’s advocacy of this concept. Even 
more, this approach does not really address the fundamental problems that Teece (1988) 
identified as basic for why R&D and innovation activities are done in-house, i.e. within the 
firm, and why firms want to maintain control over this type of activity, and how they 
balance this with their knowledge that there may be advantages in some type of “open 
innovation”-approach for their firm, such as collaboration with others, even competitors.  
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In order to understand how and why firms innovate, it may be fertile to have an idea of 
how firms make decisions on innovation activities. This will be the topic next. 
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3 How do firms make decisions on innovation 
activities?  
A tangible and convenient approach to this question is to start with an organizational 
perspective, based on the assumption that decisions on innovation activities may be 
considered as a type of investment. The term “investment” in this context is used in a 
broad sense, meaning allocation of resources for a specific purpose1
- Formal decisions, i.e. some type of approval (or rejection, which is also a decision) of 
a plan by a person with authority to make this type of decision, or, more common, 
some type of collective decision making unit, such as a board or a committee or a 
group of managers and executives, etc. These types of decisions are typically for 
approving a budget for a project, or more permanent, an annual budget for some 
organizational entity that is responsible for some type of innovation activity, such as a 
permanent R&D facility or product development unit.  
. Similar to other types 
of investments decisions, these may be characterized as either 
 
 
- Informal decisions, sometimes even experienced as a “non-decision”, in the sense that 
innovation activities are initiated without formal approval from any governing body or 
person in the firm. However, more often than not, because those initiating the activities 
have a sense of “understanding”, some type of tacit approval or climate that favours 
these types of initiatives may exist. Extreme cases of informal decisions are those that 
initiate innovation activities in secret, often after a formal rejection of a project 
proposal or because those who initiate these types of activities anticipate that the 
formal mechanism for obtaining approval will end up in a rejection. 
 
Needless to say, many in-between categories exist in the continuum between formal-
informal extremes. One common development path in innovation activities is that these are 
                                                 
1 Firms differ to the extent that these allocations are considered as investments and how they are categorized. 
One reason for this is that there are technical aspects related to taxation and accounting in this issue: If 
innovation activities are classified as capital investments they enter into the accounting book as a different 
category than if they are categorized as operational costs. Innovation activities that are categorized as 
operational costs are entered into the books as a “normal” expenditure that show up in the annual accounts of 
a firm, which in some cases make a big difference as to how profitable a firm appears to be, according to the 
accounts. Many accountants prefer to classify innovation expenses as operational costs because this makes 
their bookkeeping more convenient and more “visible” as a cost item, as one accountant expressed this.  This 
last point is, in a negative sense, significant, because it often an indication of attitudes and “company culture” 
related to innovations in a firm. Firms that think and talk about innovations and use the term investments in 
this context usually have a more strategic view of innovation activities. Those who consider innovation 
activities an operational cost often equate these types of activities with other cost items, such as salaries, 
office space rent, etc., i.e. something that should be kept at a minimum in order to make the bottom-line look 
better. 
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initiated in small scale as the result of an informal decision, e.g. exploration of some 
“bright idea”. Then, at some point, a more formal plan is made and submitted  “upwards” 
in the system for approval, i.e. a transformation into a formal decision making process. The 
informal process prior to this type of formalization is sometimes called the “Fuzzy Front-
End” of innovation process (Gordon et al., 2008; Koen et al., 2001) because it is often 
explorative, in the sense that activities at this stage are characterized by search and 
feasibility analyses. Robert Cooper, responding to a critique that his earlier “Gate-Stage”-
process did not recognize the significance and crucial creativity of this early stage of an 
innovation process, redesigned his model in an attempt to formalize what should be done 
in relationship to the first stages of an innovation process, what he terms the “Ideation”-
stage. (Cooper et al., 2000)  
 
One reason why Cooper and other analysts now advocate more formalism at this early 
stage is that these types of activities are often viewed with suspicion by management 
because they are outside formal plans and budgets. Typically controllers and financial 
management in firms consider these activities to be “fooling around” or “engineers 
indulging in their technological wet dreams”. Imposing formalism, according to these 
advocates, will give people working with development of innovation activities legitimacy. 
One experienced, highly recognized research entrepreneur said that he often was forced to 
act as a “thief”, i.e. he “stole” resources from ongoing projects that were approved in order 
to work on developing new projects that either were in an exploratory stage, or projects 
that he felt that the “burden of proof” in terms of obtaining formal approval would require 
much “illicit” homework before he could present this formally. 
 
Although the notion of a formal decision on innovations may be associated with 
bureaucratic or semi-bureaucratic decision making processes in firms of some size, they 
are also relevant for small firms, of course, this being dependent on the type of ownership 
and to what extent shareowners and investors are involved in decision making in the firm. 
Allocations of resources above certain limits are typically issues that managers need to get 
some type of approval from a governing body of a firm. Often these are parts of a budget 
process that need to be approved by a board, or some surveillance authority wants to know 
about because this is considered relevant information for the stock market. Although the 
information given may be considered summary and inconsequential, most firms have some 
type of formalized process for deciding on innovation activities.  
 
According to the findings of the Minnesota Innovation Research Project (MIRP) reported 
in Van de Ven et al. (1999), decisions on innovations are preceded by what they call the 
gestation period of an innovation journey. The term “gestation”, meaning some type of 
pregnancy, may extend for many years, “..during which a variety of coincidental events set 
the stage..” (1999, p. 10) for starting up work on developing a potential innovation. The 
decision to launch development work and to allocate resources to this is usually triggered 
by what they call “shocks”. These shocks come in many shapes and varieties, either from 
the inside or outside the organization or the firm, such as “..new leadership, product 
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failure, a budget crisis, or an impending loss of market share,..” (1999, p. 29). Shocks 
typically make the organization receptive to ideas and potential actions that will contribute 
to the sustainability and future profitability of the organization. This is were the 
“innovation entrepreneur”, often also called the “champion”,  enters the stage with his or 
her idea or proposal for doing an innovation oriented project. Van de Ven (1999, p. 30) 
explain this mechanism for initiation of innovation activity in terms of socio-psychological 
dynamics in human nature and behavior: Necessity, opportunity and dissatisfaction. 
Accordingly, they suggest that March and Simon’s (1958) explanation that dissatisfaction 
with existing conditions, typically a result of a shock, is a driver that make people search 
for new solutions that will make improvements:  People and firms will pursue this until 
they once more are satisfied, hence the notion of satisficing instead of maximizing as a 
more fertile understanding of what people do.  
 
At some point, this gestation period, which they also call initiation period, ends and a 
development period starts. The development period is initiated when some form of formal 
approval has been given by top managers or venture capitalist, in order to approve 
allocations of the resources needed for doing the development work. Innovation 
entrepreneurs and champions typically “oversell” their proposals in order to obtain 
approvals and resources. Van de Ven et al (1999, p.32) explain that they “..committed 
themselves to a course of action and set of overly optimistic expectations by investors and 
corporate sponsors”. Inevitably, these expectations are seldom fulfilled. Needless to say, 
the primary reason for this is that innovation activities are essentially uncertain – it is 
impossible to plan and anticipate the course of developing something that is unknown; if 
the course of action had been known, this would not be an innovation activity. Of course, 
innovation entrepreneurs and champions act opportunistically because they know that if 
they express their own doubts and uncertainties to their superiors, they will probably not 
endorse a project proposal. So, they have to make their hopes and visions sound like 
confident predictions and present a straight-forward, smooth development plan and budget. 
Because of this Van de Ven use the metaphor of “innovation journey”, which they 
poetically describe as a travel into uncharted territory.  
 
What happens in the course of a development process, specifically how innovation 
oriented projects evolve, will not be a topic in this paper, however, it is surprising to see a 
striking similarity in the findings made by many researchers, such as Van de Ven et al. 
(1999) and Bruno Latour’s (1987) observations and analyses of innovation processes. 
Latour uses a conceptual framework based on his ANT – actor-network-theory where key 
concepts such as “translations” and “obligatory point of passage” are strategic in his 
explanations of this process. His model accords well with the findings of MIRP2
                                                 
2 MIRP = Minnesota Innovation Research Programme 
 on how 
innovation oriented projects evolve.  Both have found that delays, cost-overruns, 
unexpected technological hurdles, conflicts and deceptions are typical, making the process 
chaotic in system dynamic sense – and vulnerable for various types of set-backs.  
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What Van de Ven et al (1999) point to is the crucial role of top managers and venture 
capitalists in the innovation development process, in particular in the initial start-up phase. 
According to them, a large number of managers are typically involved:  “Thus, the 
innovation entrepreneurs did not simply report to a single top manager or investor; they 
were accountable to a team of top managers or a board of investor/owners” (p. 48). Within 
this, different people played different roles; four distinct roles were identified: Sponsor, 
critic, mentor and institutional leader – and during development these roles were shifted so 
that at some point a sponsor would become a critic, etc. This explains why this group of 
people often had opposing views, hence this “..served as checks and balances on each other 
in making innovation investment decisions” (p. 48). Although this contradicts an important 
principle of mainstream innovation management that recommends a coherent and clear 
innovation strategy such as advocated by the NPDM3
One influential approach to decision making in innovation management is portfolio 
management. An authority in this is the approach advocated by the label of “3rd generation 
R&D”, in a book published in 1991, written by a group of consultants in Arthur D. Little, 
cf. Roussel et al.  (1991). If this book had been written today, the word “innovation” would 
probably have been included in the title, because the topic of this book is what many 
companies before called R&D, but now term as innovation. At the time when the book was 
published, many corporations and companies had closed down their centralized, corporate 
R&D laboratories; often these were simply shut down because top management believed 
that R&D, just like any other service, could be obtained on the market “on demand” and 
that doing R&D was a costly distraction for the firm -  it should stick to basics, i.e. core 
business and competence. In other firms, R&D was split and relegated to various divisions 
and business units. The ethos motivating this movement was a strong belief in market 
dynamics, not just in general in society outside the firm, but also inside the firm. This 
R&D (and innovation) management philosophy Roussel et al (1991) called the “2nd 
-guru Robert Cooper  (1996), Van de 
Ven et al. suggest that this pluralism (and ambiguity) is in fact advantageous because 
decision making in innovation activities may benefit from this:  “Pluralistic leadership 
increases the chances for technological foresights and decreases the likelihood of 
oversights. Of course, such a pluralistic structure does not ensure intelligent leadership. 
However, we expect the odds of organizational learning and adaptability to increase when 
a balance is maintained among dialectical leadership roles throughout innovation 
development” (1999, p. 124). 
 
Making decisions on start-up of development project is perhaps the most critical type of 
decision a firm makes in an innovation activity. As typical for any development trajectory, 
the direction of the development is highly sensitive to initial conditions, so sensitive that 
seemingly innocuous, small factors will grow and influence the course of development. 
 
 
                                                 
3 NPDM = New Product Development Management  
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generation R&D”, which succeeded the “1st generation R&D” in which the large, 
centralized corporate R&D organizations flourished, with the highly successful and 
prestigious Bell Labs of AT&T as the epitome of this. By advocating what they termed “3rd 
generation R&D”, they argue that the “2nd generation R&D” had “gone too far” in the 
sense that firms advocating this would gradually become obsolete and uncompetitive 
because they had cut off their capability of creating new products, services and processes 
that would give them competitive advantage – a type of advantage that is not a commodity 
for sale on markets. With this mild form of criticism of the market oriented R&D 
philosophy of the “2nd generation R&D”, they introduced the portfolio management 
approach to R&D as method for managing R&D (or innovation) activities in a strategic 
perspective. In this also, the decision making prior to the start-up of development is seen as 
crucial and this will now be explained because the book has been influential in how 
corporate managers think about innovation activities. 
 
The fundamental tenet of “3rd generation R&D” is that R&D should be closely aligned to 
the firm’s business strategy and for this reason should be considered a type of investment, 
i.e. subject to strategic analyses just like any other large investments that a firm makes for 
creating future business opportunities. In this view, R&D is part of the firm’s total 
investment; in fact, R&D may be considered as the first step in a long investment process 
which will eventually result in large investments in production plants and other material 
capabilities. Because R&D often consists of many projects and activities, all these 
elements may also be called a portfolio. Based on this, the book presents a number of 
criteria and decision making rules that top managers should consider for how a R&D 
portfolio should be made and managed. The most important primary criteria in this is 
“R&D project attractiveness” that all proposals should be analyzed before they are 
considered in a broader R&D portfolio perspective. The procedure they advocate is shown 
in table 2.1 
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Table 2.1: Typical elements of project attractiveness, according to Roussel et al. (1991, p. 
95) 
 
Elements of R&D project 
attractiveness 
Units in which attractiveness is 
expressed 
Fit with business or corporate strategy A judgment ranging from excellent to poor 
Inventive merit and strategic 
importance to the business 
The potential power of the sought-after result to: 
- Improve the competitive position of the 
business 
- Be applicable to more than one business 
- Provide the foundation for new businesses 
A judgement from high to low 
Durability of the competitive 
advantage sought 
Years: If the R&D results can be quickly and 
easily initiated by competitors, the project is less 
attractive than one that provides a protected, 
long-term advantage 
Rewards Usually financial, but sometimes “necessity work” 
(e.g., satisfying regulatory bodies) or building a 
knowledge base that becomes the foundation for 
applied work 
Competitive impact of technologies Base,  key, pacing, embryonic: If a project is 
made up of the application base technologies, it 
is classified as “base”; if a project contains at 
least one key or pacing technology, the entire 
project is classified as “key” or “pacing” 
Uncertainty  
Probability of technical success Probability units, 0.1 – 0.9. The probability that 
the objective will be achieved as defined 
Probability of commercial success Probability units, 0.1 – 0.9. The probability of 
commercial success if the project is technically 
successful  
Probability of overall success Probability units, 0.1 – 0.9. The product of 
technical and commercial probabilities  
Exposure  
R&D costs to completion or key 
decision point 
Amount of money 
Time-to-completion or key decision 
point 
Time 
Capital and/or marketing investment 
required to exploit technical success 
Amount of money 
 
According to Roussel et al. (1991, p. 96), the first element of attractiveness – fit of the 
R&D project with business or corporate strategy – is the most fundamental. If the 
assessment made of this point is positive, e.g. a judgement of “excellent”, then one may 
consider the other elements in the table. For this purpose, they suggest various methods for 
scoring these, the scale employed and how these are given comparative weight, one may 
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sum all these and obtain an overall score of each project. Based on these scores, it is easier 
to make a comparison with other, competing proposals – and for subsequent analyses that 
will determine how new projects may fit into the firm’s existing portfolio and what kind of 
priority should be given to this in relationship to ongoing projects already in the portfolio. 
They suggest a number of tools and techniques for doing these types of analyses – and 
adjustments of the portfolio, e.g. terminating projects that have become less attractive 
because of poor progress or change of business strategy or priorities, or even giving higher 
priority to others for the same reasons.  
 
The implication of adopting the methods and thinking advocated in the “3rd generation 
R&D” is that decision making on innovation activities will be based on rigorous analyses 
of project proposal, i.e. a type of professionalism in innovation and R&D management that 
requires analytical skills and a considerable amount of experience and broad expertise in 
many fields and disciplines. This is often done by senior staff members in an R&D strategy 
and planning unit, which often acts as a secretariat for various management boards and 
expert committees that are involved in decision making in large companies. In Norway, 
this is done in a few large corporations, such as in pharmaceuticals (Godø, 1997; 
Gulbrandsen & Godø, 2008) and ICT  – some even use criteria and methods that seem 
similar to the ones advocated by Roussel et al. (1991). 
 
In the Stage-Gate approach of  Cooper et al. (2000), a rigorous process prior to making 
decisions on innovation activities is also advocated. Basically, the Stage-Gate approach is a 
prescriptive model for new product development processes. It depicts this process as linear, 
in which a number of discrete activities (stages) are linked together in a chain. In the 
transition from one stage to the next, in the gates, the project will be reviewed by various 
groups of managers who make “kill” or “go” decisions as to continue (“go”) or terminate 
(“kill”) a project. These managers are called “gate-keepers”. A copy of the Stage-Gate 
model is shown in figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A new product development process according to the Stage-Gate model. 
Source: Cooper et al. (2000, p. 25) 
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According to this model, decisions on innovation activities are made at each of the first 
three gates, however, the final decision is made at “Gate 3”, after the first two stages 
“Preliminary investigation” and “Detailed investigation” have been completed and 
successfully passed the first two gates.  The emphasis in this is providing information in a 
format and types that make it possible for senior management to make priority decisions 
and decisions related to how the portfolio should be composed. Accordingly: “Every gate 
has a menu of deliverables – a list of information items that senior management needs in 
order to make effective Go/Kill decisions at each gate. Thus, project teams are well aware 
of what information they must deliver; these deliverables become the team’s objectives” 
(2000, p. 24).  
 
In addition to this type of decision-making Cooper et al. (2000) advocate portfolio 
management, which have many similarities with the advice given by Roussel et al. (1991), 
however, Cooper et al. (2000) use a more no-nonsense type of language in explaining why 
this is important: “Portfolio management is a dynamic decision process whereby a 
business’s list of active new product (and R&D) projects is constantly up-dated and 
revised; new projects are evaluated, selected and prioritized; existing projects are 
evaluated, selected, killed or de-prioritized; and resources are allocated and re-allocated to 
the active projects” (2000, p. 27). Cooper et al. (2000) suggest a number of criteria, 
techniques and practical tools that may be employed for doing this (e.g. check-lists, 
making NPV-estimates, scoring models, etc.). According to the Stage-Gate model, the 
portfolio analysis and decisions made at Gate 2 are the most significant for deciding on 
new product development activities, i.e. innovation activities, because at this point 
decisions on starting up new activities are made in the context of a portfolio analysis.  
 
When some, more academic innovation theorists, write a book on innovation management, 
they seem to weigh their words carefully (at least compared to Robert Cooper) in giving 
advice on how to innovate. One such, Tidd, Bessant & Pavitt (2001, pp. 40-48, 241) 
perceives challenges in terms of innovation management as consisting of four phases and 
types of activities: 
- Surveillance of environment (internal and external) for potential innovation ideas 
- Select the “right” kind of idea 
- Allocate resources to development of the idea 
- Implement and launch the new idea in the market. 
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The basics of this is shown in the model in Tidd, Bessant & Pavitt (2001, p. 41). 
 
 
 
Based on this structure, they – similar to Miller & Floricel (2007) – distance themselves for 
the “best practice” tradition and instead “..seek to expose the links between the structures, 
processes and culture of an organization, the opportunity for and characteristics of 
technological innovation, and the competitive and market environment in which the 
organization operates” (Tidd et al., 2001, p. 15). Still, they recommend that managers, 
when they are going to make decisions on innovation activities, consider the following 
aspects: 
- Develop innovation framework based on business strategy 
- Develop a strategic concept, which should be clear, tangible – and testable in terms of 
market, production, design, etc. 
- Pilot testing in market places and with technological experts, 
- Integrating different perspectives, i.e. establish multidisciplinary groups and use of 
simulation tools (e.g. rapid prototyping) for evaluation of concepts, 
- Involve suppliers and subsystem designers in the process, 
- Work with lead users, 
- Use screening techniques in selection 
- Interact with outside institutions, e.g. surveillance authorities, compliance with 
standards, etc. 
 
All these admonitions – and many more – bear a close resemblance to what Robert Cooper 
advices, but without his flow-charts, detailed check-lists and macho language. A “Nordic 
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model” of the same process puts emphasis on transdisciplinary cooperative working groups 
in innovation activities as something good, e.g. as depicted in the “integrated product 
development” concept of Lars Hein and Mogens Myrup Andreasen 
(2000, p. 23), and a copy of their model is shown below. The reason for this similarity, 
which is also shared with many other product development  theorists, e.g. Ulrich & 
Eppinger (2000), is that this has become a mainstream approach to product and service 
development. Accordingly, much of the attention and emphasis is set on selection and 
decisions related to how ideas for innovation activities should be elicitated, detected, 
developed and – finally – selected. 
 
What many of these prescriptive types of articles and books have in common is that they 
offer tangible tools and recipes to managers on how to make decisions on innovation 
activities. The target audience of this type of literature is managers, those who actually 
make decisions and work in settings where doing innovation activities is important. 
Needless to say, this “how-to-do” type of literature is not only prescriptive – it is just as 
normative in the sense that they advocate that making decisions on innovations should be 
the result of rational choice and judgment, with the explicit message that profitability of 
the firm is the most important criteria for this. However, it is possible to identify another 
type of message, a more veiled message, in this: This is what you should do in order to 
“beat the system”, in the sense that if the prescriptions are followed, then the type of 
creative activity that innovation is, this will flourish.  
 
 
Source: Andreasen & Hein (2000) 
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3.1 Capturing ideas 
Many companies have policy measure and mechanisms in addition to the organizational 
ones described above. One such is to put emphasis on elicitation and capturing of ideas for 
innovation activities. The basic idea in this is that the main challenge in development of 
innovations is to obtain and develop “good” ideas for new products, processes and services 
– and that these ideas often are floating around in the universe outside and inside the firm. 
Wide arrays of methods are often employed, ranging from systematic market and trend 
research to various systems of suggestion boxes. Some firms expend many resources on 
the latter type and have designed systems for collecting, sorting and analyzing various 
types of input. Although the vast majority of ideas are rejected, those that are selected for 
further development may be promising for future innovation activities.  
 
Personnel policy is sometimes used for promotion of innovation activities. The rationale of 
this is that if the firm has high quality employees, they will contribute to the innovativeness 
of the firm. Recruiting bright, young engineers, scientists and experts is a common strategy 
for many firms. This is often combined with a personnel policy of keeping the average age 
of people working with innovation low, i.e. young people are believed to be more creative 
and innovative than older employees. For this purpose, various incentives (e.g. “career 
plans”) are made so that R&D people or others who work with innovations will be moved 
over to other parts of the organization as they become older.  In one variety of this policy, 
managers are expected to make annual evaluations of their subordinate’s performance and 
those who are rated as “sub-standard” are encouraged to leave the company. In one 
company, General Electric, the target is set at 20%, i.e. that each year 20% of the people 
should at all times be classified as sub-standard and substituted with new and potentially 
more innovative employees. Over time, according to this policy, the company’s manpower 
will consist of employees who have capabilities to innovate.   
 
3.2 Divisionalization 
As pointed out above, the degree of formalism, routines, rules (often called “policy”) and 
procedures related to decision making in innovation activities reflect size and 
organizational structure of the firm. Large firms, typically multinational corporations, are 
usually divisionalized; each division is usually an autonomous profit unit with own 
budgets, investment plans and strategies. The degree of autonomy within a divisionalized 
firm may differ much. A common characteristic of divisionalized firms is that innovation 
activities is the responsibility of the division. In some firms, this is even more 
decentralized, so that units within a division (they are often also autonomous “profit 
centers”) or subsidiary firms “owned” by the division are expected to take care of their 
own innovation activities. This principle creates numerous strategic paradoxes and tensions 
in large firms. The basic rationale for this organizational principle is to make sure that 
innovation activities, specifically R&D, is relevant for its users, i.e. the divisions or units 
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within a division, because in this type of setup costs for innovation activities are paid by 
the users or clients within the unit or division doing the innovation activity (Fransman, 
1992; Roussel et al., 1991). In Norway, Norsk Hydro introduced this principle in their 
corporate structure as early as in the 1960s (Andersen & Yttri, 1997), in part because the 
top management were dissatisfied with what they felt was irrelevant R&D done in their 
centralized R&D system.  
 
In other words, the tenets of this way of organizing innovation activities is that “users” 
should be responsible for innovation activities and for making adequate resources available 
for doing this. Hence, formal decisions on innovation activities are taken by the top 
management of divisions, or by the leaders of profit centers or subsidiaries, if they are 
given this type of autonomy and responsibility. Coupling and alignment of innovation 
activity with business strategy is of course a very sensible idea for a number of other 
reasons, such as presumably more efficient communication because of organizational 
proximity (including the trust factor) and ease of knowledge flow. However, the strength 
of this principle is also its weakness: Because of its focus on innovation activities related to 
existing products or services and the political power that controls these activities, they will 
tend to favour incremental innovations, i.e. favour activities that make minor 
improvements on the existing product portfolio and services – and relate themselves to 
existing market segments. In other words, the firm will gradually become conservative and 
minimize innovation activities because the incentives in a divisionalized structure is to 
keep all kind of costs as low as possible; the bottom-line is the main success criteria for 
managers and executives. In sum, this may result in a sub-optimal strategy for the firm. 
This is widely recognized and acknowledged and explains why many firms have enacted 
strategies to counter-balance this. 
 
One common strategy for counter-balancing innovation conservatism in divisionalized 
firms is to allow for and actively encourage some type and degree of “free” innovation 
activity. There are numerous ways of doing this, however, allocation of resources to this 
type of activity is usually made at the corporate level by some kind of policy decision. One 
typical policy states that 10% of the allocations to R&D should be given to projects that 
explore new business and technological opportunities, i.e. “new” often meaning that these 
opportunities are perceived to be outside the corporation’s current line of businesses. This 
may be financed by the levy of a “R&D and innovation tax” on divisions, as an element of 
their corporate financial contribution. In exchange for this, divisions may be given a 
membership in the committee that decides on these types of corporate innovation projects. 
These committees make recommendations, often following a rigorous research council 
type of procedure, to the board of executive, who make the final approval and allocations. 
In some corporations, outside experts, often highly recognized academics, are asked to 
become members, in order to boost the legitimacy and innovativeness of decisions and in 
order to have pipelines and networks to outside R&D communities (Godø, 1997). In these 
types of corporate policies, a typical statement that is often made may be this: “It is a 
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corporate responsibility to ensure the long-term viability and profitability of our firm 
through innovations in the markets”.  
 
There are numerous ways of implementing the type of “free” innovation activity described 
above. Some firms have corporate R&D units which take care of this type of research, but 
this is controversial because many executives think that these units are “useless”; they 
think that corporate scientist like to do “blue sky” research and have academic ambitions, 
i.e. have agendas that are not compatible with the firm’s business strategy and needs. In 
some firms, projects financed by corporate money are “given” to R&D or product 
development units in divisions. A more novel model is to create “virtual R&D 
organizations” composed of participants from the whole corporation (Gulbrandsen & 
Godoe, 2008). This is often used in multinational corporations where innovation activities 
are geographically dispersed and highly heterogeneous in terms of competencies and 
market conditions.  
 
3.3 Temporal cycles in decision-making 
As organizations, firms follow a temporal rhythm in terms of decisions on innovation 
activities. Typically, decisions on innovations are closely aligned with budgetary processes 
in the firm. In most companies, budgets for the next year are made during the autumn. 
There are of course numerous sources for input to these budgets, but often the firm’s 
strategy play an important role. Activities related to strategy are typical early year or 
spring-time activities; an important input to these is the accounts and results from the last 
year. The types of analyses that are presented in strategy processes relate to issues on 
innovation activities. A typical outcome of such a process may be consensus on the 
importance of a new direction – and that some type of activity relevant for this should be 
initiated. In Japanese firms, the budgetary year starts (and ends) on 1st of April, but the 
implications of this phase discord compared to the rest of the world has not been analyzed.  
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4 Structural perspectives on innovation 
activities 
In analyzing how firms do their innovation activities, there are two general perspectives or 
factors that seem to be influential: 
 Size of the firm, and closely related to this, geographical extension of the firm, and 
 Policy and/or strategy cycles. 
 
Both factors are often closely related to the diffuse, but nevertheless important factor of 
“firm culture” and identity, but this topic will not be discussed in the following. Just how 
size and cycles of strategy and policy interact is also a matter of interest, but this is also a 
challenging topic because it is difficult to observer and specify just how these factors 
interact, i.e. how they manifest themselves empirically and what kind of causalities or 
dynamics are involved. This may explain why research literature on this topic is scarce and 
tentative. 
 
Size and geographical extension are structural factors that are closely aligned. This, as 
pointed out, is an important aspect in how decisions on innovation activities are made. 
According to one study (Tirpak et al., 2006), one may observe a correlation between size, 
as measured by the number of employees and volume of revenues of a firm, and how they 
organize their innovation activities, in particular R&D:  “Small” companies, e.g. firms with 
less than 1,000 employees, more often than not, have a concentration of their innovation 
activities in and around one centralized R&D unit that has the main responsibility for doing 
innovations related activities, typically, such as product development. As the company size 
increases, decentralization and distribution becomes more common.  
 
Modern firms typically cope with growing size of their firm by divisionalizing their 
organization, for a number of reasons: The most important reason is to make various parts 
of the company more flexible and agile, while at the same time make each unit more 
accountable and focused on obtaining value creation and results. The common (and real) 
fear is that as the organization grows in size, it may quickly become bureaucratic, 
inefficient and loose its business acumen. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, when 
divisionalization is introduced, innovation activities are also often divisionalized, which in 
many companies means that formerly centralized R&D entities are split up and distributed 
to various divisions. De facto, a similar process occurs when firms establish subsidiaries or 
expand into other countries and (for them) new markets. This may also be done for 
additional reasons: A new R&D site or similar type of entity responsible for innovation 
activities in the “new” country may be needed in order to do product development for local 
market adjustments, but also for establishing networks with local knowledge communities 
and for long-term recruiting of local talent in the country they want to grow in 
(Gulbrandsen & Godoe, 2008). This picture becomes complex because often geographical 
expansion is done by mergers and acquisitions – and all of a sudden the mother company 
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may find itself owning a R&D facility that came along with the company that was taken 
over. Sometimes these are closed down in order to create what in corporate language is 
often described as “synergy effects”, but another option is to introduce “corporate policies” 
that assign “corporate responsibility” for a particular type of product or technology, i.e. 
some type of division of labour and specialization is introduced, as seen i large 
corporations such as ABB.   
 
However, as the company (or corporation) grows even larger (and becomes truly 
multinational), a hybrid type of organization of innovation activities seem to become 
prevalent. According to Tirpak et al. (2006), this type of organization seem to emerge 
when the company has more than 10,000 employees and/or has passed the US$ 5 billion 
mark in terms of revenues. This is termed “hybrid” because companies often re-establish 
some type of centralized R&D activity closely affiliated with the corporate headquarters, 
while maintaining the decentralized system of innovation activities and R&D in the 
divisions, i.e. the divisions continue to have responsibility for innovation activities in their 
“spheres of interest”. Tirpak et al. explain this: “Today the pendulum appears to be 
swinging back toward centralization, not because there is less short-term pressure but 
because companies have largely used up their “seed corn”, i.e. new ideas and technologies 
enabling them to grow the enterprise” (2006, p. 23-24). 
 
This explanation fits well with what has been expressed by some CEOs, as reported in 
interviews, cf. Gulbrandsen & Godoe (2008), i.e. that they should have some capability 
within the organization to anticipate and explore technological and market opportunities 
that may represent new business and potential threats to their existing business models. 
This strategy also fits with the observations that large corporations often pursue “second 
mover” strategies (Gilbertand & Bormbaum-More, 1996; Nerdrum & Godoe, 2006), i.e. 
that they expend resources on surveillance in terms of technological and market trends in 
order to respond quickly if and when competitors or new entrants launch new products or 
services that may be superior to their own. As long as a large corporation is a market 
leader, it will favour incremental innovation activities that support its existing product or 
service portfolio; it will not take the risks and burdens of being a first mover. Hence, they 
allocate “corporate money” for what they euphemistically often term as “free R&D”, i.e. 
explorative innovation activities and associated scouting. As discussed elsewhere in this 
paper, this may be done in a number of different organizational solutions.  
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5 Cycles in strategy and policy 
Decision-making on R&D and innovation activities is somewhat related to the question of 
cycles in innovation strategies, more specifically to what some theorists have termed as the 
oscillation between “exploration” and “exploitation” strategies – and terms that are 
synonymous with this. These two concepts depict firm level behavioural implications of 
what may broadly be called policy thinking and decision making relevant for innovation 
activities. James March defined and elaborated these concepts in a seminal article in which 
exploration was explained as activities related to “..search, variation, risk taking, 
experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation” (1991, p. 71). In contrast, 
exploitation is activities related to “..refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, 
implementation, execution”. March elaborates this by suggesting that “Both exploration 
and exploitation are essential for organizations, but they compete for scarce resources” 
(1991, p. 71). However, this is essentially a distinction between “..refinement on an 
existing technology and invention of a new one” (1991, p. 72), i.e. what may be termed as 
a strategy for pursuit of incremental innovations vs. radical innovations. In the hybrid 
organizational model that large corporations tend to adopt, establishment of these 
“hybrids” may be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile these two opposing strategic 
directions. 
 
In Van de Ven et al. (1999, p. 184-191), this fundamental dichotomy is relabeled as a cycle 
of “divergence” behavior, and contrasted with “convergence” behavior of the firm. Both 
are steered by constraining factors and enabling factors. Divergence, which is close to 
March’s concept of exploration, “..involves branching behavior that explores and expands 
in different directions” (1999, p. 184). Its attributes are: Creating ideas and strategies, 
learning by discovery, pluralistic leadership, building relationships and porous networks – 
and creating infrastructures for collective advantage. The latter may include R&D 
collaboration with other firms or universities, or participation in standard setting activities, 
etc. This type of activity is characterized as “running in packs”. In contrast to divergence, 
convergence behavior, which resembles March’s term exploitation, is a strategy of 
“..integrating and narrowing...that focuses on testing and exploiting a given direction” 
(1999, p. 185). Its attributes are: Implementing ideas and strategies, learning by testing 
(trail and error), unitary leadership, executing relationships in established networks – and 
operating within infrastructures for competitive advantage. In Van de Ven et al (1999), 
these concepts, as factors that drive innovation activities, are seen as dynamic in a chaos 
system perspective, i.e. within a strict mathematical understanding of chaos as a nonlinear 
dynamic system. Accordingly, development is seen as following a predictable pattern, 
although it may be difficult to make exact predictions of the individual path of each case, 
somewhat similar to a cyclone drifting erratically across the globe, yet in a general 
direction. This, according to Van de Ven, sets the course of development of an innovation 
activity, hence their depiction of this with the metaphor “innovation journey”:  “The 
journey entails maneuvering through stretches of divergent and convergent waters” (1999, 
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p. 213). So their advice to managers is that they should master both types of behavior – and 
should be capable of recognizing situations where one strategy should be chosen instead of 
another.  
 
March (1991) makes a simulation of how organizations that follow either “exploration” or 
“exploitation” develop over time. He suggests that the exploitation strategy will give 
results that are “..positive, proximate, and predictable”, whereas for exploration, the results 
“..uncertain, distant, and often negative” (1991, p. 85). Accordingly, the burden of proof 
for explorative strategies are much more challenging than for exploitation, which may 
explain a bias for short-term strategies. This aspect is not addressed in Van de Ven (1999), 
but in both, the temporal dimension is long, development over years.  
 
If we accept the usefulness of concepts such as divergence/exploration and its contrast 
convergence/exploitation as relevant for explaining innovation activities, it also becomes 
relevant to ask how this is translated or embedded in decisions firms make on innovation 
activities. How do managers make decisions? Clearly, they do not think in terms of 
abstract concepts such as “convergence” or “divergence”, but probably more in terms and 
concepts that are relevant for articulating and promoting their interests and understanding 
of what should be done in terms of innovation activities, and, of course conveying this in 
discussions with peers and power-holder in their organization, who may be rivals and 
opponents. This then points to how decision-makers (usually managers) think about and 
understand the role of innovation activities in their organizations, which is a topic we ask 
informant about in the MINE Norway survey. This and other results from the survey will 
be reported in other papers from the project. 
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6 Systemic approaches 
Concepts such as convergence/divergence point to factors that influence or are at play in 
innovation activities, i.e. outcomes of decisions on innovation activities. In this, the notion 
of “innovation journey” competes with notions such as “innovation games”, “technological 
regimes” and “innovation regimes”. To varying degree, these concepts may also be seen as 
representing systemic models for explaining innovation behavior and activities of firms. 
The basic idea is that understanding how a system works will also provide explanation of 
how and why actors make decisions. Within innovation theory, the conceptual framework 
of sectorial systems of innovation is perhaps most interesting (Godoe & Nygaard, 2006). In 
the sectorial systems of innovations approach, the concept of technological regime is 
defined and used in two somewhat divergent ways: one technology studies approach, and 
second, an economics of innovation approach. Elucidation of this is relevant for 
understanding these two nuances: 
 
In the technology studies approach, the main focus is set on the technology itself and its 
environment. Rip and Kemp (1998, p. 340), using this approach, define technological 
regime as “…the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of engineering practices, 
production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of 
handling relevant artefacts and persons, way of defining problems; all of them embedded 
in institutions and infrastructures”. Within this type of notion, some theorists have 
developed the concept of dominant design (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Utterbach & Suarez, 
1993) to designate an observed technological stability and predictability in the 
development patterns, what others call technological trajectory (Dosi, 1988) or 
technological signposts (Sahal, 1985). 
 
In the economics of innovation approach, more emphasis is put on understanding the 
economic relationship between the innovating firms (e.g. in a sector) and their 
environment.  Of course, technology is very basic in this approach too (cf. (Malerba, 
2004); technological characteristics are the most important dimension in distinguishing one 
sector from the other. In this, some theorists (Breschi & Malerba, 1997) set focus on four 
factors, or attributes, which they suggest are important in differentiating sectoral systems 
of innovations and for explaining salient features of each sector in terms of how 
innovations are made: 
- Opportunity conditions related to profit expectations, which may differ according to: 
o Level, i.e. scale of high to low 
o Variety, i.e. large or little variety in technological solutions 
o Pervasiveness, i.e. scale of high to low 
o Sources, i.e. open vs. closed, and many vs. few 
- Appropriability conditions, i.e. the capability or the degree to which an innovation or 
invention may obtain protection; this dimension may be differentiated in a scale of high 
(e.g. patents) to low. 
  34 
- Cumulativeness of technological knowledge, i.e. the possibility of building a reservoir 
of knowledge – and the ability to exploit this for development of innovations. 
- Nature of relevant knowledge base, i.e. inherent characteristics and qualities related to 
the required knowledgebase, e.g. if these are “open”, complex (expert knowledge) or 
tacit. 
 
Although both approaches to sectorial systems of innovations are fertile for explaining 
innovation dynamics within a technological regime, neither approach is capable of 
explaining how a new sector emerges and establishes a new technological regime. This is 
relevant for the discussion of exploitation vs. exploration, because one interpretation may 
be that the concept of technological regimes uses criteria that are biased towards 
exploitation (convergence) type of thinking. In this way, one may provide interesting 
explanations of a particular technological regime, but not why it changes or why and how 
new technological regimes emerge. 
 
Often radical technological innovations constitute a central element in the establishment of 
a new technological regime and a new sectorial system of innovations, as evident in the 
role of GSM in the growth of a mobile communications sector.  In the creation of these 
radical innovations, strong innovation regimes outside established technological regimes 
often play an important role. The creation of GSM and Internet as radical innovations 
emerged from such innovation regimes. In the case of GSM, the relevant innovation 
regimes  were constituted by actors in what subsequently became the ICT-sector, i.e. the 
fusion of the computer technology industry with the telecommunications industry (H. W. 
Chesbrough & Teece, 1996; Godoe, 2000).  Whereas in Europe, standardization 
organizations such as ETSI and CEPT played an important role in the development of 
GSM, in USA, the office of DARPA was important as organizer and catalyser for the 
development of Internet (Mowery & Simcoe, 2002).    
 
The role of technological regimes and innovation regimes may be considered as contextual 
factor, i.e. factors that Van de Ven et al. (1999) possibly would classify as constraining and 
enabling factors that frame innovation behaviour and decision-making in terms of 
convergence and divergence. From an analytical point of view, one could say that this type 
of systemic approach may provide a logic or explanation on a general level as to outcomes 
of innovation behaviour and related decision-making. Providing this type of logic is also 
the ambition of the conceptual framework of  “Innovation Games”, which in many ways 
bears resemblance to the systemic theories presented above, but this will be the next topic. 
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7 The conceptual framework of “Innovation 
Games” 
In the research done in the MINE-project, one of the published papers (Miller & Floricel, 
2007) presents a review of the literature relevant for exploring and analyzing the 
conceptual framework of “innovation games”. In their approach, they have structured this 
into what they call “three theoretical pillars” of relevant innovation studies: 
- research on innovation systems, 
- theories about the role of shared cognitive frameworks in structuring social systems, 
- research on the sources of heterogeneity in innovation processes. 
 
Of these, the most relevant in terms of answering the question of how firms make decisions 
on innovation activities is the second one, the one about the role of shared cognitive 
framework in structuring social systems, because these are related to actions and action 
rules. Miller and Floricel explain that this type of research is relevant because they focus 
on “..decision-making processes that, together with a capacity base, enable managers to 
develop and implement innovation strategies” (Miller & Floricel, 2007, p. 8). Accordingly, 
rules and conventions that prescribe what to do may provide blueprint for what kind of 
decisions that are actually made. Some of these are general and shared by “everyone” 
within a culture or a society.  
 
According to Miller & Floricel, there are more specific “rule of games”, i.e. that each type 
of innovation game have sets of “rules” that are unique for the firms that participate in 
these. This assumption is also part of the conceptual framework of technological regimes. 
In their mind, rules of the game “..offer a clear path to implementation” in terms of 
innovation activities, which explains their suggestion that “..rather than recommending 
concrete strategies and investments, the rules state ideal propensities to innovate and to 
create barriers, attack, or cooperate” (2007, p. 9). In justifying this, they attempt to make 
an analogy to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) notion of grammar, i.e. “rules” that are 
embedded in a language and that people have to adhere to when they communicate. For 
this reason, the “rules of the game” approach has more explanatory power than those that 
explain innovation activities in terms of life-cycles or waves (e.g. Schumpeter (1934 
(1974)), Perez (2002)), or evolutionary, systemic approaches (e.g. Edquist et al.  ( 2004) 
and Lundvall (1992)). The role of rules in an innovation game is, according to Miller & 
Floricel that of forming a “..coherent totality around the value creation process” (p. 10) – 
and this also explains the dynamic that is active in generation of heterogeneity. 
Accordingly, understanding innovations is a matter of understanding how firms interpret 
and apply rules when they play their game. These rules seem to emerge from contextual 
conditions that are variable; these variations may in turn determine what type of game that 
emerge. There are three dimensions in these: 
- knowledge production dynamics, i.e. the flow of new, relevant knowledge, 
- structuring potential, i.e. the potential for firms to capture value 
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- demand specificity, which refers to what type of demand and purchasing powers that 
customers have. 
 
In their model, these three dimensions are put on a tripartite, ordinal scale (high-average-
low) matrix – and various combinations of the three dimensions and their value on the 
ordinal scale define different games. In theory, this may provide 27 different categories of 
innovation games, however, Miller & Floricel (2007) have identified 11 distinct games. In 
an earlier paper (Miller & Floricel, 2004), only eight games were presented, which means 
that criteria for what constitutes a game is flexible. In this latter, earlier article, distinction 
was made between five fast (rapid) games of innovation and three slow games of 
innovation. Below, these will be briefly presented, first the five fast games, and then the 
three slow games of innovation: 
 
1. Battles for Architecture: Telecom services and equipment, B2B and mass market 
software, electronic test and measurement equipment. Salient aspects of this game are: 
- Value created by coordinating with other players 
- Struggle for de facto standardization 
2. Races to the Patent and Regulatory Offices: Biotechnology. Salient aspects of this 
game are: 
- Create intellectual property 
- Ability to productize university research or IPR and manage regulatory processes 
3. Delivering Safe Science-based Products: Pharmaceuticals, agro-biotech, medical 
devices, and home appliances. Salient aspects of this game are: 
- Productizing academic research 
- Deliver absolutely reliable & safe products; cost-efficiency 
4. System Design and Consulting Services: MIS consulting and design, consulting and 
research for power systems, telecom research services, office equipment. Salient 
aspects of this game are: 
- Design systemic architecture with dominant or emerging standards 
- Propose integration with hardware, software tools and communication protocols – 
act as knowledge clearinghouses 
5. Research, Development and Engineering Products and Services: Computer 
modeling, drug research and discovery, specialty cosmetic ingredients research. Salient 
aspects of this game are: 
  37 
- Transform learning from leading-edge customers and universities into products and 
services 
- Anticipate and understand complex needs of their services 
According to Miller & Floricel (2004), they found three slow games of innovation. These 
were: 
1. Delivering Workable Solutions in Packs: Chemical products, industrial gas products, 
packaging materials, building materials, pharmaceutical ingredients. Salient aspects of 
this game are: 
- Neither rapid scientific nor technological change 
- Deliver large-scale and problem-free solutions to industrial customers 
- Firms invest in IPR-management & cooperate with customers and partners 
2. Asset-Specific Problem Solving: Cement, electric utility, pulp & paper, petro-
chemicals, mining & oil extraction, water treatment. Salient aspects of this game are: 
- Capital-intensive sectors 
- Productivity, quality and customer service important 
- Optimalization and continuous cost reduction 
3. Customized High-Tech Craft: Industrial controls and equipment, engineering design 
tools, specialty food ingredients, specialty chemicals, electronic equipment. Salient 
aspects of this game are: 
- Slow technical change, moderate institutionalization, very demanding clients 
- Understanding needs of expert clients 
- Delivering customized solutions compatible with existing solutions – reliability and 
cost reduction 
According to the conceptual framework of  “games of innovation”, each game has what 
Miller & Floricel (2004, 2007) call a “dominant logic” for value creation – and, more 
interesting for us – rules that determine how innovation activities should be organized, i.e. 
organizational forms that are related to the contextual conditions and “dominant logic of 
value-creation”. Hence, they spell out four sets of rules: 
- Innovation capability in terms of knowledge, engineering and management, and ability 
to transform and commercialize scientific knowledge, 
- Network skills, i.e. building relationships to external parties such as customers, 
investors, competitors, regulators, etc., 
- Competitive and collaboration strategies, which influence allocation of resources to 
doing innovation activities such as R&D and/or collaboration with other firms. 
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Depending on what type of game the firm participates in, the R&D intensity for some 
is in the range of 40% of their revenues, while in others, this may be as low as 1-2 % of 
the revenues. 
- Internal organization of innovation activities, which varies according to what type of 
game the firm is playing. In some, innovation activities play an important role and have 
attention of top management; in others, this is something “taken care of” by some 
obscure R&D unit in the firm. 
 
According to Miller & Floricel, the conceptual framework of innovation games is an 
evolutionary model, hence dynamics of evolution are relevant for how they develop. In 
this, there are three key concepts: 
- variation, which is created by individual and corporate agents (2007, p. 25); in 
particular entrepreneurs play an important role in creating variation, but the rate of 
knowledge production is also an important source, 
- selection, which occurs because of the competition between ideas, technologies and 
firms, 
- retention, in which rules become institutionalized and create various types of path 
dependencies that constitute developmental trajectories.  
 
Looking more closely at the theoretical explanations given for justifying the conceptual 
framework of innovation games, the ambition seems eclectic, in the sense that they have 
attempted to assemble elements from a number of different theories on innovation for 
explaining something that resembles explanations that have been developed within the 
framework of sectorial systems of innovaton (Godø, 2008). Miller and Floricel are explicit 
in pointing out that their use of the term “game” has nothing to do with the mathematical 
understanding such as in “game theory”, but their use of “game” as a metaphor has been 
inspired from sports, such as a game of soccer, where teams are the metaphorical 
equivalent of firms. In this way, one may suggest that their justification for doing the 
MINE-survey in which the purpose is to map how managers of innovation activities 
perceive and judge different aspects related to innovation may be parallel to asking a 
captain or a team coach of a sports team. The latter point is not spelt out or explained in 
this way, but it seems to be a fair interpretation of their suggestion that they want to 
“..identify the rules of the game by measuring and comparing managers’ cognitive 
representations of the value-creation network, participants and roles, strategies and 
practices” (Miller & Floricel, 2007, p. 28). 
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8 Modes of knowledge and innovation 
One way that organizations differ in terms of innovation activities and how they make 
decisions on these, is the role of knowledge and mode of innovation. This topic has been 
explored by theorists who suggest that innovation activities and the way these are 
implemented and carried out (mode of innovation) depend on, or interact with, the type of 
knowledge that is used – and how this knowledge is produced, i.e. developed, obtained, 
adapted and refined. In 1994, a group of researchers led by Michael Gibbons published a 
book (Gibbons et al., 1994) suggesting that two, qualitatively different, yet equally non-
trivial modes of knowledge production now co-exist in modern societies: Mode 1, which is 
the traditional academic type of knowledge production, and Mode 2. The latter type of 
knowledge production is created in the “context of application”, i.e. most commonly in 
organizations and settings outside academia. This type of knowledge is created for solving 
problems that are non-trivial, more often than not because existing knowledge does not 
provide solutions for these.  The book instigated an intense debate which has not yet abated 
(cf. Godoe, 2007; Hessels & van Lente, 2008), but the idea of Mode 2 may be interpreted 
as having relevance in explaining innovation activities. A more elaborate approach to the 
same issue of knowledge production has been suggested by Asheim and Gertler (2005) in a 
conceptual framework in which distinction is made between three broad categories of 
knowledge: 
- Analytical knowledge, i.e. knowledge based on scientific methods and codified 
information 
- Synthetic knowledge, i.e. knowledge based on experience and learning-by-doing, tacit 
type of knowledge 
- Symbolic knowledge, i.e. knowledge conveying emotional and immaterial values, 
normally reserved for cultural and artistic enterprises. 
 
The first category of knowledge, analytical knowledge, is similar to what others call STI-
mode of knowledge, STI being an acronym from Science, Technology and Innovation. 
STI-mode is seen in contrast with DUI-mode; DUI is an acronym for Doing, Using and 
Interacting. DUI has resemblance with the category synthetic knowledge. In an oral 
presentation of the paper (Jensen et al., 2007) which presents research done for exploring 
these two concepts, one of its authors, Bengt-Åke Lundvall, said that the STI-DUI 
dichotomy is different from the Mode 1 and Mode 2 dichotomy, because STI and DUI 
mostly concerns different ways of doing innovations within the domain of what Gibbons et 
al. (1994) would call Mode 2-type of knowledge production4
- interdisciplinary work groups 
. In Jensen et al. (2007), the 
results from a large survey in Denmark (DISKO) is presented. As indicators of DUI-mode, 
the following attributes were used as identifiers: 
- quality circles 
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- system for collecting proposals 
- autonomous groups 
- integration of functions 
- softened demarcations between employees groups 
- cooperation with customers 
 
The attributes listed above are important elements in the IPD-model of Hein and 
Andreassen presented elsewhere (Andreasen & Hein, 2000) in this paper, which in many 
ways should not come as a surprise because both originated in Denmark. As identifiers of 
STI-mode, the following attributes were used as identifiers in analyzing the results from 
the DISKO-survey: 
- expenditure of R&D as a share of total revenues 
- cooperation with researchers at universities or scientific institutes 
- workforce composition, i.e. its share of scientifically trained personnel 
 
Based on an analysis of their material, Jensen et al. (2007) found that firms that have 
pursuing a mixed strategy “..combining the two modes [i.e. DUI and STI] tend to perform 
significantly better than those relying predominantly on one mode or the other” (2007, p. 
689). This interpretation is significant because of its compatibility with the four basic 
“rules” that are associated with the conceptual framework for “innovation games” (Miller 
& Floricel, 2007) reviewed earlier. However, it is also significant because it provides an 
approach and strategy for understanding innovation performance in firms:  If we are able to 
identify and characterize what type or combinations of knowledge that a firm develops and 
uses, we should also be able to understand and predict the “hows” and “whys” of their 
mode of innovation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
4 This explanation was given during a seminar in Oslo, 30 October 2007, but I think this is not convincing 
because it contradicts some of the tenets of Gibbons et al. (1994) definition of Mode 1. 
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9 Discussion and research agenda 
In the research literature on how firms make decisions on innovation activities, a number 
of competing, yet essentially similar explanations seem to co-exist. They seem competing 
because different terms, concepts, styles and approaches are used, hence they also seem 
distinct, so different that at first glance they appear to be in disagreement and contradiction 
with each other. But a closer look at these show that the differences may indeed be 
superficial, somewhat similar to the differences between various brands of toothpaste: 
They are essentially identical in substance but come with slightly different flavour and 
packaging. An example of this was seen in comparing March’s (1991) concepts of 
exploitation and exploration with Van de Ven et al.’s (1999) notion of divergence and 
convergence in innovation strategy cycles and policies. Similarly, the conceptual 
framework of “innovation games” (Tirpak et al., 2006) has many similarities with the 
concept of “technological regimes”, more so than differences of nuances that make them 
appear as distinct. 
 
Still, there are distinct differences in terms of the intent of this literature and the kinds of 
discourses that these present. The literature that has prescriptive intent, i.e. books and 
articles that have a clear message of “dos” and “don’ts” to the manager in terms of how 
they should manage innovation activities and strategies in “real life” product development 
processes are clearly different from those that have a normative or ontological intent. In 
fact, researchers such as Van de Ven et al. (1999) and Bruno Latour  (1987) seem to relish 
the discrepancy between “textbook ideals” of how innovation activities should be carried 
out – and the empirical reality of what actually happens in firms during innovation 
processes. The systemic approaches attempt to explain this as the result of a complex set of 
factors that in sum constitutes a system, e.g. a technological regime, which in turn explains 
outcomes of decisions and processes. In the conceptual framework of “innovation journey” 
(Van de Ven et al., 1999) and “innovation games” (Tirpak et al., 2006), innovation 
processes are viewed and explained as a complex interaction between structural, systemic 
characteristics (contextual factors) and dynamics related to creating something new for 
markets. Although both approaches, “innovation games” and “innovation journey” provide 
profound insights as to how innovation activities are carried out, Miller and Floricel’s 
(2007) presentation of a “dominant logic” for a specific innovation game and the set of 
rules that are relevant in these, seem to capture the most important factors in innovation 
activities. These were, as pointed out earlier: 
 
- Innovation capability in terms of knowledge, engineering and management, and ability 
to transform and commercialize scientific knowledge, 
- Network skills, i.e. building relationships to external parties such as customers, 
investors, competitors, regulators, etc., 
- Competitive and collaboration strategies, which influence allocation of resources to 
doing innovation activities such as R&D and/or collaboration with other firms.  
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- Internal organization of innovation activities, which varies according to what type of 
game the firm is playing.  
 
Although these factors provide an adequate framework for analyzing and understanding 
innovation processes, they do not provide understanding for how and why initial decisions 
on innovation activities are made. The crux of the matter seems to be what happens in the 
“Fuzzy Front End” of an innovation process, or what Van de Ven et. Al (1999) calls the 
“gestation period” that precedes a decision to start up innovation activities, in the early, yet 
crucial initial period in the innovation process. Research point to this period more as a 
play, more often than not,  highly informal processes, in which innovation entrepreneurs 
are active. If the innovation entrepreneurs are “successful” this may end up as a formal 
decision that starts up an innovation activity, a product development process or project. 
Typically, the formal decision is made by top management, various boards and 
committees, owners and investors. They negotiate, argue, manipulate, make alliances in the 
way that Van de Ven et al calls “pluralistic leadership” (1999, p. 48). Four roles were 
identified: Sponsor, critic, mentor and institutional leader – and these roles were passed 
around among the power-holders in the firms. 
 
Although most innovation research – including the highly prescriptive literature on product 
development processes – seem to agree that this early stage of an innovation process is 
important, even essential and crucial for a number of reasons, our understanding of what 
happens at this stage is not satisfactory. Using Cooper’s terminology, one may ask: Is a 
“go”-decision made because of “gut feelings” among managers? Are decisions as 
“rationalist” as prescribed by textbooks? How do more ulterior, aesthetic factors influence 
decisions? How much are decisions made because of the charisma and rhetorical and 
political skills of innovation entrepreneurs and champions? 
 
The next step in researching some of the questions asked above will be to explore and 
analyze the material from the MINE-survey. This will provide data on the four “sets of 
rules” that were pointed out above – and by this provide an empirical framework for 
probing further into the questions asked on what happens when decisions on innovation 
activities are made – and what explains the outcomes of these decisions, i.e. why specific 
decisions are made.  
 
Although interesting results and new insights may be obtained from this type of analysis, 
this will only provide some general, approximate insights. Still, these will give important 
knowledge  and – possibly – tentative explanations of how firms make decisions on 
innovation activities, i.e. what happens during the “gestation period” or in the “Fuzzy 
Front-End” of an innovation process. In many ways, this appears to be a “black-box” 
within the “black-box” of innovation processes in firms and organizations. Asking 
managers about this process will probably provide answers that accord well with technical-
economic rationales of how innovations should be managed. From different perspectives 
and theoretical approaches, some research suggest that a number of other, less well defined 
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and understood tacit factors may play an important role:  Few, if any contemporary 
innovation research seem to recognize the role of serendipity and aesthetics as a factor in 
innovation processes, although many inventors and innovators suggest this is significant in 
their work (Andel, 1994; Roberts, 1989). One could add to this the role of playfulness and 
intuition (Basalla, 1988; Ferguson, 1993), as epitomized in the notion of homo ludens. 
Although the concept and role of “entrepreneur” or “champion” often alludes to these 
attributes as a salient feature of their personality, they are not made explicit as factors in 
the research on innovation processes. One reason for this may be that these factors are 
difficult to research, possibly because many researchers have no training in how to 
approach such phenomena (i.e. they are economists, engineers, etc). However, instead of 
ignoring these factors and consider them irrelevant or “anecdotal”, one should probe 
further into this matter, in order to analyze to what extent these influence and shape 
activities and outcomes in the embryonic, yet crucial phase of innovation processes.  Then 
this should become an important goal for future research. 
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